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ABSTRACT 
 
The poverty alleviating benefits of gender-targeted microcredit programs has successfully been 
demonstrated in South Asia. In this paper, we examine the demand for credit by Indonesian women, in 
the absence of such a targeted microcredit program. We argue that when credit markets are imperfect 
and there are informational asymmetries, it is important to take into account the possibility that 
individuals may have no knowledge of or be unwilling to borrow due to constraints. Our results show 
that selection bias cannot be neglected, and ignoring double-selection may lead to an underestimation 
of loan demand by nearly one hundred percent. We find that given knowledge of credit facilities, 
women in female-headed households, and better networked women are more likely to borrow. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Microcredit programs are increasingly being promoted as a key 
strategy for poverty reduction and social transformation in developing 
countries (Morduch, 1999). An early pioneer, the Grameen bank of 
Bangladesh, provides small loans specifically targeted at females from 
poor households. By lending to individuals who lack conventional 
collateral and depend on expensive private creditors, the microcredit 
institutions play an important role in filling the gap due to information 
problems in the formal credit markets. They rely on joint liability and 
frequent small deposits to minimize risks and transaction costs, self-
selective mechanisms to generate group collateral, and often provide 
targeted training and information sessions with the aim of improving 
the quality of life of their borrowers and their families. Administrative 
costs are kept down by coordinating delivery of services and collection 
of dues through decentralized units competing in field performance. 
Banking on the thriftiness, acumen, and enterprise of asset-poor 
women, they combine financial services with social intermediation to 
organize credit groups. Working with such groups seems to lower risks 
and transaction costs through self-selective joint liability and peer 
pressure, minimizes both paperwork and leakage, and generates a cost-
effective outreach (Bennett and Goldberg, 1993). 
 
There is strong previous research to suggest that the gender of the 
microcredit program participants matters (Pitt and Khandker, 1998; 
Hashemi et al, 1996).i The justification for targeting female borrowers 
is often made on the grounds that same-sex rural groups from similar 
but uncorrelated income levels (as in Grameen, SEWA, BRAC) work 
better for low-cost peer monitoring, efficient delivery and recovery, 
and borrower trust with positive expectations (Rashid and Townsend, 
1992). Indeed the Grameen’s performance is better than most poverty-
targeted programs without group monitoring and even in the 
cooperative run program such as Indonesia’s BRD (Bank Rakyat 
Desa), repayment rates are higher for women borrowers. Furthermore, 
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previous experience from countries with successful microcredit 
programs have found that targeted microcredit programs through 
training have succeeded in generating employment among poor 
women. This welfare-enhancing nature of targeted programs is 
particularly important developing countries, where women are often 
among the poorest segments of society. Furthermore they face limited 
opportunities for wage employment. Indeed, the World Bank’s 
statistics have revealed that unemployment rates for women are higher 
than men in virtually every country in the world, and that women in 
general make up the majority of the low-paid workers (Khawari, 
2004). Finally, several studies have established a positive link between 
maternal control over economic resources and the welfare of the 
children in the household (Strauss, 1990; Glewwe, 2000; Pitt and 
Khandker, 1998; and Panjaitan-Drioadisuryo and Cloud, 1999). Pitt et 
al (2003) specifically show that credit provided to women improves 
measures of health and nutrition for children.  
 
However, despite the plethora of microcredit institutions in 
Indonesia, and the success of targeted microcredit programs in 
Bangladesh, India and Bolivia, there is no such targeted microcredit 
program in Indonesia. Therefore, in the light of the potential poverty 
alleviation benefits from targeting females, this paper seeks to asses 
the demand for credit by Indonesian women. We use the rich and 
unique dataset, Indonesian Family Life Survey 2000 (IFLS3) in our 
empirical estimation. 
 
Our paper makes several important contributions to the literature: 
first, our estimation technique addresses a key shortcoming in 
previous research on credit markets (such as Cavalluzzo et al., 1998; 
Bernheim, 1991; Badu et al., 1999; Lanzona, 1998). These studies 
typically predict the probability of participation in the credit program 
and then estimate the size of the loans. This means that they 
implicitly assume that all women have complete knowledge of credit 
markets. However, we argue that in developing countries where 
credit markets are imperfect, it is also important to consider the 
possibility that women may have no knowledge of or may be 
unwilling to borrow due to cultural constraints, or risk aversion 
towards debt. Neglecting these possibilities may produce inconsistent 
estimates in the absence of perfect credit markets.  
 
Second, in contrast to previous studies on microcredit from 
Indonesia (Okten and Osili, 2004; Yamauchi, 2004; Panjaitan-
Pradisuryo and Cloud, 1999; Gertler et al, 2001), we examine the 
demand for credit by female married borrowers rather than looking at 
the issue at the household level. This group of borrowers is likely to 
derive the greatest benefit from having access to microcredit. 
 
Finally, our dataset also allows us to explore the correlation 
between borrowers’ and lender’s decisions. In particular, we test 
whether or not loan approval is dependent on borrower-provider 
relationship. These issues are important in developing countries, 
where there are imperfections in credit markets, and lending in the 
absence of collateral is often motivated by the lender’s subjective 
evaluation of the borrower’s re-payment ability. 
 
Our empirical strategy therefore is to employ a two-stage 
approach with sequential bivariate probit model with sample 
selection in the first-stage followed by a least-square estimation in the 
second-stage. The sequential condition arises because women must 
first know where to borrow if they need credit, and then make a 
decision on whether or not to borrow.ii Then, in the second-stage, 
conditioning on these first-stage results – which involves the lender’s 
decision as well, we estimate the size of the loans demanded. This 
approach is novel in this literature.  
 
The main empirical results can be summarized as follows. Taking 
into account the bi-stage sample selection, our results show that the 
predicted demand for loan can be underestimated by nearly 100 
percent in a naïve model that ignores any selection rule. Controlling 
for just one-stage selection rule is also not sufficient, since it still 
  3 
leads to an underestimation of the loan demand by 24 percent. We 
also find a strong positive correlation between knowing the loan 
providers and getting the loan. This correlation may reflect the 
advantages of having social networks. Our analysis shows that 
women from female-headed households, better educated and better 
networked women are more likely to have knowledge of credit 
facilities and to borrow.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we 
briefly describe microfinance institutions in Indonesia. This is 
followed by a discussion of our econometric strategy in Section 3. 
Section 4 describes our data, Section 5 presents the results, and in 
Section 6, we conclude.  
 
2. Background 
 
In Indonesia, a microfinance institution (MFI) is defined as an 
institution that provides small loans of up to Rp.50 million 
(US$9262) per client (Bank Indonesia, BI). Indonesia has a vast 
number of microfinance programs that provide financial services to 
low income households. The main microfinance providers in 
Indonesia include Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), Badan Perkreditan 
Rakyat (BPR), private banks, cooperatives (e.g., Koperasi Unit Desa 
(KUD)), semi-formal financial institutions (e.g., Lembaga Dana dan 
Kredit Pedesaan (LDKP) and Badan Kredit Desa (BKD)), 
International bodies (e.g., the World Bank), the national pawnshop 
(Perum Pegadaian, PP), and the national post office. In 2003, some 
20 percent of the population relied on micro- and small-businesses as 
their main income-source (Asia Resource Centre for Microfinance 
(ARCM), 2005).  
 
The largest microfinance provider is the Village Bank operated by 
BRI (BRI-UD). Its vast and deep outreach is due in part to its 
successful saving mobilisation which lowers the costs of credit 
provision to rural areas. BRI–UD typically lends to the better-off of 
the poor and to established entrepreneurs. It requires its borrowers to 
put up collateral, though the collateral in this context is often defined 
loosely, and the bank staff have some discretion to increase the loan 
size for reliable borrowers who may not be able to fully collateralize 
their loans. Since 1999, BRI-UD has become a global leader in rural 
financial intermediation, with 3 million borrowers and 28 million 
depositors by 2002. In 2001, its average loan size was US$181 
(2001Rp.), offered at effective rates of 31-45 percent (Charitonenko 
and Afwan, 2003). Repayment rates are also high at 98.3 percent. 
However, its share of women borrowers is low, and in fact has 
declined from 24 percent in 1996 (Ravicz, 1999), to 18 percent in 
2002 (Khawari, 2004). Ravicz (1999) on the other hand documents 
five other microfinance initiatives that have greater rates of female 
participation (40-60 percent), that make smaller loans that have no 
collateral requirement. 
 
The success of MFIs in Indonesia can partly be attributed to the 
various ingenious schemes that they employ to encourage repayment. 
More specifically, to overcome the presence of large screening and 
monitoring costs faced by formal sector lenders, MFIs generally 
resort to the group-lending mechanism, which is a replication of the 
village-lending tradition, relying on self-formed groups to minimize 
asymmetric information problems through the use of peer-screening, 
social pressure and peer-monitoring. MFIs are exploiting group 
members’ aversion towards social or non-monetary sanctions, such as 
exclusion or shame, to lower the probability of default, and to 
credibly threaten a defaulting borrower with denial of future loans to 
her, and all her group members (joint-liability scheme). Morduch 
(1999) argues that the small regular repayment schedules imposed by 
many MFIs also allow women to partition their commitments into 
manageable levels which in turn enforce repayment discipline. And 
likewise, dynamic incentives, another of MFIs’ innovative schemes, 
which rewards good credit history in the form of possible larger loan 
amounts in future, ensures continuing creditworthiness of their 
borrowers. Indeed, MFIs have found – and benefited from – the 
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appropriateness of this scheme with the women’s relative immobility 
and the smaller choice-set they face, as it permits prolonged 
assessment periods before they decide to increase the loan sizes.  All 
these schemes in turn help keeping their costs low. 
 
Microcredit can be particularly advantageous to women as well 
for several reasons. First, it provides women with better access to 
capital at relatively low rates of interest, which increases their 
liquidity position directly, and allows them to smooth consumption 
and accumulate assets (Matin et al., 1999). As in most developing 
countries, women in Indonesia are among the most vulnerable sections 
of society and face limited opportunities for wage employment in the 
formal sector economy (see Berger, 1989; Assaad and Arntz, 2005). 
They are typically employed in the unorganised, informal sector of the 
economy, self-employed in small-scale farming, domestic services or 
petty trading (see Khawari, 2004; Berger, 1989). The creation of 
micro-enterprises allows women to interact with the market, with their 
group members and other institutions outside their home. A recent 
study by Yamauchi (2004) for instance, finds that IDT (Inpres Desa 
Tertinggal) loans have encouraged self-employment among women 
aged 41-60 years.   
 
Previous studies have found a strong link between women’s 
access to credit and the welfare of their household (Pitt and 
Khandker, 2003; Sharma, 2002; and Chemin, 2003). In particular, 
Panjaitan-Drioadisuryo and Cloud’s (1999) study of Indonesian 
married women who had accessed to loans from the Small Farmers 
Development Program (SFDP).iii Their study finds that women 
consistently devote any additional income to more nutritious food and 
better health care and their children’s education. Moreover, they find 
that women are more creditworthy relative to men, as the program 
recorded a 17 percent higher repayment rate relative to BKK (Badan 
Kredit Kecamatan), which also lends to men.  
 
Further, previous results on Bangladeshi households reveal that 
access to microcredit allows consumption smoothing across seasons 
in farming households (Pitt and Khandker, 2002; Morduch, 1999). As 
discussed previously, there is also a strong link between women’s 
access to microfinance and the welfare of their household (see Pitt 
and Khandker, 2003; Panjaitan-Drioadisuryo and Cloud, 1999; 
Sharma, 2002; and Chemin, 2003).  
Microcredit participation and selection 
The bulk of previous studies can be classified under an impact 
assessment study. They attempt to answer a counterfactual question: 
how would the treated unit have fared in the absence of the 
implemented program? The critical process in answering this 
question has been to build a credible control group, which in the 
absence of the program, would have similar outcomes than those 
exposed to the program. However, difficulties arise due to the 
heterogeneity of individuals, the manner in which they are screened, 
geographical-targeting of programs, or more importantly because 
participation is voluntary. 
One technique to control for this selection is matching, which 
involves collecting as many covariates as possible to build a 
counterfactual control group. Provided that all differences that reflect 
selection are identified, this method performs quite well. Chemin 
(2003) uses Kernel-matching and finds that household, demographic 
and economic characteristics significantly influence microcredit 
participation. However, not all factors can be measured or observed, 
and omitting relevant variables is likely to result in serious 
inconsistencies of the parameter estimates. A common treatment in 
the literature is to use Heckman’s two-step procedure, which first 
predicts the probability of participating in the credit market and then 
running a regression on the outcome variable (see Bernheim, 1991; 
  5 
Lanzona, 1998; Badu et al., 1999). The selection is therefore treated 
like a once omitted variable that is now accounted for. 
However, Webb et al.’s study (2002) on Bangladeshi poor, finds 
that 84 percent of women in their sample refused to borrow because 
of their fear of debt or of others’ perception of them being in debt. 
Concerns like these in turn can easily discourage borrowing. This 
suggests the possibility of selection before being in a position to 
decide whether or not to borrow. Furthermore, in environments of 
imperfect information and credit markets information about 
microcredit programs may not be readily available.  
3. Analytical Framework 
Our main hypothesis is that in order to assess demand for credit 
by women, the first step is to analyse whether or not the individual 
woman has knowledge of any credit facilities. An OLS model under 
these circumstances is likely to be biased, as women who did not 
know of credit facilities and did not apply for loans are omitted from 
the sample. If we restrict the sample to only those women who know 
of credit facilities, it ignores the fact that not all women that know of 
credit facilities borrow. A probit-tobit (probit-estimate the likelihood 
of knowledge of credit facilities and tobit-estimate the loan amount) 
combination instead takes into account the censoring of the 
dependant variable (loan amount) that is absent in a probit-OLS 
(probit-estimate the likelihood of borrowing and run OLS regression 
on the loan amount) combination. However, a probit-tobit model is 
still too restrictive, as it treats women who do not know of credit 
facilities in the same way as women who know of credit facilities, but 
do not borrow.  
The bivariate probit model on the other hand, discriminates 
between the two types of women and accounts for the possibility of 
correlation between the stage of knowing of credit facilities, and the 
stage of borrowing and getting the loan approved. More specifically, 
a woman receives credit ( 0)iB >  only if she knows where to 
borrow ( 1)iK = , applies for loan, and her application is successful 
( 1iB = ). Hence, there are three layers in the borrowing process. The 
first layer, having knowledge of potential loan providers, is likely to 
be individually determined, whereas the next two layers- applying for 
loan and the outcome of the loan application, involves both demand- 
and supply-side determinants. In other words, both the success of 
loan approval and the size of the loan are contingent on decisions 
made by lenders. The final loan amount therefore reflects an 
equilibrium outcome, which provides full information on the supply-
side conditions – but not the demand-side conditions.       
Suppose that we observe all the three stages. The most desired 
model will be a type of trivariate discrete-choice model with sample 
selection. The second and third layers are only relevant when the 
woman knows where to borrow. This model is able to capture both (i) 
the correlation between having knowledge of credit facilities and the 
decision to apply for loans; and (ii) the correlation between the 
decision to apply for loans and the decision of the loan provider to 
lend. 
However, it is also clear that this model is only plausible if credit 
markets functioned perfectly, and if loan providers are formal 
financial institutions (whose decisions to lend are based on economic 
motives). In imperfect credit market settings, a complete separation 
of these layers may not be possible. Potential borrowers may face 
borrowing constraints, such that, although they know where to 
borrow, they do not borrow (even if they require credit) if they 
anticipate difficulties in obtaining loans or in their repayment ability. 
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Studies by Morduch (1999), Webb et al. (2002) and Panjaitan-
Pradisuryo et al. (1999) show that women borrowers have low default 
rates, which possibly reflecting their careful self-assessment of 
repayment ability before applying for loans. Furthermore, given the 
informal nature of the lending process, decisions to lend may be 
influenced by non-economic factors such as social networks.    
Hence in this paper, we take into account the fact that the second 
and the third layer are jointly observed. A bivariate probit model is 
used, hypothesising that there is interdependency between knowing 
the loan providers and successful loans. However, the bivariate probit 
model considered here is not standard where all four possible 
outcomes are possible. Suppose we define the four sets of 
observations as: 
 Borrow 
Know 0 1 
0 
S1 
( do not know, do not 
borrow) 
S2 
(do not know, borrow) 
1 
S3 
(know, but do not 
borrow) 
S4 
(know, borrow and 
approved) 
This selection is due to the sequential nature of the underlying 
process.iv Each loan incidence satisfies the condition know = 1 and 
borrow = 1, which corresponds to the bold-path in figure 1. Positive 
loan amounts are observed only when the woman applies for loan and 
it is approved ( 0iB KB> = ), although we observe information for all 
women.  
Figure 1 below shows this argument diagrammatically. Clearly, set S2 
is not possible (dashed-path). 
 
The standard reduced demand for loan equation can be written as: 
ln( )i i i i iB I H Vα θ δ ω ε= + + + +   (1) 
All women 
Do not know 
places to borrow 
Know places to 
borrow
Do not borrow
    (S1) 
Borrow 
(S2) 
Do not borrow 
(S3) 
Borrow and approved 
                    (S4) 
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where iB  is the amount borrowed by woman i  and α  is the constant 
term. To keep the notation concise, the above equation can be written 
as: 
i i ib x β ε= +       (2) 
where ( , , , )β α θ δ ω=  and ix  is the i th row of the X  matrix, 
consisting of i ’s individual, household and village characteristics that 
are included in the model.  
Let the utility from knowing where to borrow be *iK , and the amount 
borrowed be *iB  . The selection rules are: 
*
2 2 2i i iK x β ε= +  , 1iK =  if * 0iK > ; = 0 otherwise  (3) 
*
1 1 1i i iB x β ε= +    , 1iB =   if * 0iB > ; = 0 otherwisev  (4)  
Under the assumption 2 1( , )i iε ε   bivariate normal (0,0,1,1, bρ ), where 
bρ  is the correlation coefficient between the two disturbance terms, 
the probability of a positive loan amount can be written as 
1 1 2 2Pr( 0) ( , ; )
b b
i i iB x xβ β ρ> = Φ , where bΦ  denotes the cumulative 
bivariate normal distribution function.  
The log-likelihood function is given 
by:
4 3 1
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2ln ( , , ) ln ( , , ) ln[1 ( )]
b b b b
i i i i i
i S i S i S
L x x x x xβ β ρ β β ρ β
∈ ∈ ∈
= Φ + Φ − − + −Φ∑ ∑ ∑
 (5) 
Equation (5) is estimated using the Full Information Maximum 
Likelihood (FIML) method. Note the two likelihood equations can be 
estimated independently by two probit models, if and only if 0bρ = .  
We then estimate the size of loan demand as given by equation (2) 
above. The bivariate probit model yields two inverse mills ratios, 
capturing the effects of unobserved characteristics of women who 
know of credit facilities on the loan amount, and the effects of 
unobserved characteristics of women borrowers and the loan 
providers on the loan amount. The conditional, corrected expected 
demand for loan is given by: 
*
1 1 2 2( 1, 1, ) ( , , )
b
i i i i K Ki i iE b K B X x x xβ γ λ β β ρ
∧ ∧∧ ∧= = = +
 * 1 1 2 2( , , )
b
B Bi i ix xγ λ β β ρ
∧ ∧∧ ∧+     (6) 
This model has the advantage of taking into account both layers of 
selections. In the standard one-step selection estimation, probit-
estimating women who know of credit facilities would neglect 
knowledgeable non-borrower women. However, if we probit-estimate 
women who borrow, we then neglect the first layer selection.  
3.1 Econometric Issues 
There are however two potential sources of endogeneity that need 
to be controlled for. First, the analysis is based on cross-sectional 
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data hence it is possible that the error terms contain some unobserved 
factors that affect the outcome variable, leading to inconsistent 
estimates. With a panel dataset, fixed-effects treatment is commonly 
used to purge this correlation away, assuming it is time-invariant. In 
this study however, all regressors are treated as exogenous, reflecting 
permanent or life-time variables. Furthermore, many of these events 
have already occurred. For example educational investments have 
already made. Correcting for unobserved characteristics in this case 
may not be trivial. Although in practice one can resort to household’s 
fixed-effects transformation by treating each household as a separate 
cluster – thus equivalent to running a model with as many dummy 
variables as the number of households in the sample – we run the risk 
of creating more problems. The sample only includes adult married 
women, and in more than a third of the sample households, there is 
only one woman in the house. Further, since we are not attempting to 
isolate any program’s effect community fixed-effect strategy may 
backfire by purging the correlation between knowing the loan 
providers, many of whom are local networks, and the loan approval 
( bρ ), which is of interest to us.vi Also, while instrumenting 
potentially endogenous variables is an option, the losses from not 
finding a good instrument makes it an unattractive option. 
The second potential source of bias is the possibility of a 
systematic relationship between loan amounts and household income. 
In countries where microcredit programs have already been 
implemented, the extension of credit is typically used for income-
generating activities. Hence a relationship between them is expected, 
or in fact guaranteed. But in the case of Indonesian women, their 
demand for credit may be motivated by one-off consumption needs.  
The third source of endogeneity is the possibility that 
policymakers have preferences for program location, which are 
unobservable to the researchers. However, in our current study, 
endogenous placement is not relevant as the program has not been 
implemented. 
4. Data 
The data for this paper comes from the Indonesian Family-Life 
Survey, conducted in year 2000 (IFL3). The data was collected by the 
RAND cooperation and the Center for Population and Policy Studies 
(CPPS), of the University of Gajah Mada, Indonesia. The IFLS3 is a 
random sample survey, covering thirteen of the 27 provinces, where 
approximately 83 percent of the population resides. Four provinces 
are located in Sumatra Island (North, West and South Sumatra, 
Lampung), five in Java Island (West, Central and East Java, DKI 
Jakarta, Yogyakarta) and the four remaining provinces include Bali, 
NTB, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi. The IFLS survey is 
unique and ideal for our analysis since it contains detailed economic 
and non-economic information collected both at the individual and 
household levels. To complement this information, the IFLS team 
also collects information at the community-level on infrastructure 
conditions, such as the availability of financial institutions and the 
quality and accessibility of public facilities in the community.  
The sample is restricted to those adult ever-married females aged 
15 years and above for whom complete information is available with 
regard to individual, household, economic and demographic 
characteristics. Further, we exclude women who have moved to non-
IFLS communities since the earlier waves, as their new community 
information is not available in the data set.vii This reduces the sample 
to 8,688 women.  
Dependent variables 
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For each of the two selection equations, the dependent variables 
for our analysis are the binary latent variables, taking on a value of 1 
for knowledgeable women and borrowers respectively, and zero 
otherwise. For the loan demand equation, the dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of the total amount of loans received in the past 
twelve months.  
Women are defined as being “knowledgeable” if they know of at 
least one loan provider besides their friends and relatives, and “non-
knowledgeable” otherwise.viii Under this definition, a knowledgeable 
woman may never have gone to school (i.e., formally not 
knowledgeable) but may know of someone or some institution that 
can lend to her in the event of financial need. Alternatively, a woman 
may have six years of education, but in response to the question of 
whether or not she knows of any loan provider, she answers no. In 
this sense, she is defined as non-knowledgeable. Of course, it is likely 
that knowledgeable women are also literate and vice versa. 
Correspondingly, non-knowledgeable women may well be over-
represented by women with low education, or those living in remote 
areas. 
Then, let women borrowers refer to knowledgeable women who 
attempted to borrow and managed to secure at least one loan over the 
past twelve months, and women non-borrowers refer to 
knowledgeable women who did not attempt to borrow at all during 
the past twelve months. This group also includes women who 
attempted to borrow but failed to secure any loan over the period 
since they constitute a very small proportion of the entire sample.  
The final sample consists of 5,508 knowledgeable women, of 
whom only 878 are borrowers. As can be seen, the sample is 
disproportionately distributed with only 10 percent in the S4 set (the 
group having knowledge, borrowing and being successful), making it 
a small sample relative to the other sets. All loans are actually 
microcredit using the Indonesian banking definition and we observe 
that women borrow occasionally, but when they do borrow, they tend 
to be sole-borrowers. For example, less than 20 percent of their loans 
were co-borrowed with other household members (mostly husbands), 
and only around 4 percent were co-borrowed with non-household 
members.  
Fifty-eight women reported being turned down at least once, but 51 
of them managed to secure at least another loan in further attempts. 
However, when compared to males, this proportion is 40 percent 
lower, suggesting some gender bias. Then, what is interesting is that 
most of the subsequent loans were provided by the same providers 
that turned them down in their first attempt. Further investigation also 
reveals that more than three quarters of these subsequent loans were 
provided without requiring collateral. 
Table 1 shows the distribution of loans according to their 
providers and collateral requirement. Local providers, particularly 
cooperatives, neighbourhood associations and members of women 
lottery group (arisan) generally provide their loans without requiring 
collateral (i.e., 96% of all non-bank loans were provided 
uncollateralized). For government or semi-government banks on the 
other hand, uncollateralised loans accounted for only 28 percent of 
their loans. In addition, further investigation reveals that 88 percent 
of all repeated loans were obtained from the same providers, and that 
local providers experienced the most post-visits. This highlights the 
crucial role played by local networks (local information and shared 
trust) in serving women in needs of financial resources in the absence 
of formal schemes, such as microcredit program.  
In Table 2, we tabulate the loans according to their providers and 
the purpose for which they were borrowed. We observe that only 37 
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percent of these informal sector loans were spent on capital investment 
or on education, whilst larger proportions were spent on consumption 
purposes, perhaps due to the relatively small size of these loans. Note 
that the total number of loans in the table is larger than the number of 
borrowers because some women borrowed more than once. In our 
sample, loans from non-bank institutions ranged from Rp.4,000 ($0.43) 
to Rp.5 million ($537), which are much smaller than the loans 
provided by banks (between Rp.10,000 ($1.08)  to Rp.40 million 
($4,298)).  
Explanatory variables 
Our first key explanatory variable is a dummy variable for female 
headed household. Table 3 presents a select group of descriptive 
statistics comparing women living in male- and female-headed 
households. It is interesting to note that women from female-headed 
households tend to be less educated, poorer and have fewer family 
and social networks.  
The second important set of variables are measures of social 
networks, which can be an important means of information 
dissemination, including information on potential credit programs 
and means to access them. We define social networks as activities at 
the village level that the woman can participate in, and measure it at 
both at the individual and household levels. At the individual level, 
we consider arisan and the number of other community-based or 
government activities and programs that took place in the last twelve 
months, such as community meeting, voluntary labour, a member of 
women’s organisation (PKK), and weighing post for young children 
(posyandu). Arisan is the most popular form of women’s gathering in 
Indonesia.ix Arisan is particularly popular among women because in 
addition to its financial aspect, it acts as a form of informal social 
gathering, and is seen as an important means of information sharing. 
In general, arisan participation is voluntarily (sometimes by 
invitation) and members know each other quite well. The community 
arisan is typically attended by older, married women, while younger 
women tend to participate in their workplace’s arisan. Note that 
arisan itself is not a lending organisation. When a member wins a 
draw, she receives the lump-sum amount just this time, but has to 
continue making periodic contributions until every member has 
received a lump-sum. Loans from arisan group in this case are in fact 
private loans given by members of arisan group. At the household 
level, we include a dummy variable for whether any household 
member belongs to cooperative(s). Such external membership may 
provide benefits to other members in the family (e.g., food stamps or 
use of cooperative’s facility). 
From Table 4, we observe that women borrowers record higher 
levels of participation in all three social activities. Specifically, 74 
percent of borrowers are arisan participants, borrowers participated 
in at least one community program over the past year and 22 percent 
of them belong to households with cooperative membership.  
Third, we consider the presence of parents and the number of 
non-coresident siblings to capture the availability of family-based 
support networks.  
We also include age and education as control variables. The 
theoretical life-cycle model of consumption predicts that the 
probability of having debt decreases with age ceteris paribus. 
However, if a woman is too old then her chances of getting credit 
may be significantly lower. Therefore, we include women’s age and 
its squared term.  
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Educational attainment is measured by highest education level 
attained, namely elementary, junior high, senior high, and college. 
They correspond to 6, 9 and 12 years of schooling respectively. 
Those with tertiary qualification are pooled with senior high school 
graduates, as there are only so few of them in the sample. We also 
include husband’s education.  
To take into account the economic characteristics of the 
respondents, we consider household and individual assets. This 
variable is exogenous to demand for credit as it reflects ‘permanent 
income’, as opposed to transitory incomes. We define asset as the 
total value of a woman’s personal assets (non-earned incomes, 
saving, jewellery), and household assets (farm and non-farm assets, 
belongings). We further include a dummy variable for the presence of 
non-labour income (e.g., pension funds, scholarships, winnings).  
We also control for religion, household size and the number other 
borrowers in the house and whether the household had experienced 
economic failure in the last 5 years.   
We take into account village characteristics that reflect the 
supply-side conditions, and control for differences in environment 
and resource endowments by including a range of variables that 
reflect village level economic and development. They are: (i); 
whether or not there is public transport system in the village (ii) 
whether there is market in the village, as local market, apart from its 
functioning as a trade centre, may facilitate information-sharing; (iii) 
the distance (in kilometres) from the village community centre to the 
nearest formal financial institution offering loan products, to account 
for the availability of local formal loan provider; and (iv) whether the 
village had been a target of at least one government program that is 
related to credit (including IDT villages), as it may alter local 
facilities and villagers’ attitudes towards borrowing. Among IFLS3 
communities, 48 percent received at least one program related to 
farming since 1996, of which 64 percent involved credit extension, 
and 89 communities are IDT villages. In addition, we include dummy 
variables for urban/ rural area distinction and for regions. Indonesia’s 
inner islands (Sumatra, Java, Bali) are known to be more populated 
and relatively more developed relative to its outer islands (Sulawesi, 
NTB, etc). Accordingly, relatively more development and poverty 
alleviation programs are directed to these islands due to their denser 
population and higher poverty levels.  
And finally, as traditional money lenders (rentenir) typically 
provide strong competition to formal lenders in developing countries, 
we include a dummy variable which takes on a value of one if the 
woman recognises rentenir amongst the loan providers they know, 
and zero otherwise. Rentenir, like a typical informal money lender, 
can offer quick and easy credit and are easily accessed by their 
borrowers. However, interestingly, in the sample, very few women 
acknowledge that they can borrow from a rentenir.x Nevertheless, the 
village heads’ approximations on the interest rates charged on their 
loans ranged widely from 2 to 50 percent per month. 
5. Econometric results 
The main results of the analysis are discussed below in Tables 5 
and 6 of the Appendix. In Table 5, we report the first-stage bivariate 
probit results. Columns [1] and [2] report coefficients from the 
knowledge of credit facilities and the borrowing likelihood equations 
respectively. The marginal effects are listed in column [3]. Note that 
these marginal effects are the effects to the likelihood of borrowing, 
given knowledge of credit facilities – not the other way around.xi 
Table 6 presents the regression estimates for the loan amount 
demanded. In table 6, we present results comparing a double 
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selection model [1] to a single selection [2] and a model with no 
selection [3]. 
There are two selection terms (inverse mills ratios) from the 
bivariate probit selection model: the first one captures the 
relationship between the unobserved characteristics of those women 
who know of credit facilities and the loan amount, and the second one 
which captures the relationship between the unobserved 
characteristics of both women borrowers and the loan providers, and 
the loan amount. In addition, since all equations are estimated jointly, 
we can also estimate the correlation between the borrowing stages. 
This correlation may reflect some unobserved characteristics such as 
the individual woman’s social networks. In Table 5, we find that this 
correlation is positive and highly significant. This implies that 
estimation using two (or three) univariate probit models yields 
inconsistent estimates, as it neglects this correlation.   
In the final stage regression (Table 6), the loan amount received is 
modelled as a function of the social networks and individual 
characteristics that are observable to loan providers. Both inverse 
mills ratios (lambda) are significant. This suggests that the previous 
stage selection rule (i.e., the likelihood of having knowledge of credit 
facilities) cannot be neglected. Estimation using one-stage correction 
method would be inconsistent. The negative sign of the lambdas 
suggests that unobserved factors which explain knowledge of credit 
facilities and credit market participation (e.g., attitude towards debt) 
are negatively correlated with the loan amount. Now, since in our 
case, the final loan amount is the equilibrium amount that also 
involved the loan provider’s willingness to lend, not simply an 
amount that is asked for by the women, this result may suggest some 
limitations in the existing loan provisions as it also captures the 
unobserved characteristics of the loan providers. xii  
We then predict the final loan amount taking into account the 
double selection rule in Table 6 (Column [1]). In Table 6 Column [2] 
and [3], we report the predicted loan amount from a traditional one-
stage model and a model that assumes there is no selection for 
comparison. At the means of all explanatory variables, the predicted 
loan amount demanded taking account the double selection is 
Rp.682,600, whereas that from the one-stage selection model is 
Rp.552,000, and that predicted by the naïve Least Square is 
Rp.347,500. This suggests that the familiar one-stage selection model 
only predicts some underestimation (59 percent), but the double-
selection model predicts underestimation for nearly 97 percent. With 
sample averages from the IFLS3, the corrected predicted loan 
amounts are comparable with the monthly household income (i.e., the 
sum of all incomes by household members) of a typical Indonesian 
household (Rp.560,600), but it is still considerably short of the 
amount needed to finance an average child’s schooling costs 
(Rp.828,900).xiii  
In what follows, we discuss some of the other main results from 
the bivariate probit model, followed by the conditional loan demand 
regression.  
Knowledge and likelihood of borrowing  
The main results of the first stage of the analysis can be 
summarized in terms of three main results. First, we find that women 
from female-headed households are both more likely to know of 
credit facilities and to borrow. Second, in general, there seems to be a 
positive relationship between social networks and credit market 
participation. Arisan participants for instance, are 7 percent more 
likely to be informed about credit facilities and get access to credit. 
Similarly, a greater involvement in community activities and 
cooperatives increases both knowledge on availability of credit and 
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chances of getting credit. The size of the benefits from community 
membership is fairly large. Our estimates show that the chances of 
success in obtaining credit increases by 1.5 percent for each 
additional community activity that the woman participates in. The 
probability of credit success is 6 percent higher if a family member 
has membership of a cooperative. On the contrary, having parents 
alive and the presence of non-coresident siblings has no significant 
effect on the likelihood of borrowing.  
Third, our analysis shows that higher education encourages the 
likelihood of both being knowledgeable and borrowing. For example, 
relative to women with no formal schooling, ceteris paribus, primary 
school graduates are 4 percent more likely to borrow given 
knowledge, while highly educated women have a 6 percent higher 
probability of borrow given knowledge. This indicates that education 
increases both knowledge of credit markets and the likelihood of 
success in the credit market. Interestingly though, we find that while 
husband’s higher education is positively associated with wife’s 
knowledge, they do not help to lower the wife’s requirement for 
external credit. A similar result is found with regard to increases in 
wealth.  While women are more likely to have knowledge of credit 
facilities as they become wealthier, their borrowing outcomes are not 
significantly affected by an increase in wealth.  
With regard to other individual and household characteristics, we 
find that the likelihood of borrowing increases with age non-linearly 
until women reach the age of 65 years. Meanwhile, when household 
grows in size, there are two effects opposite effects. First, household 
income is likely to be larger if there are more working adults, and this 
may reduce demand for credit. On the other hand, larger households 
may have more young children, which may increase their need for 
credit. The effect of household size on demand for credit therefore 
seems ambiguous. Our results however show that the first effect 
dominates. An increase in the number of household borrowers 
however, increases the likelihood of borrowing.       
In terms of community characteristics, not surprisingly, an 
increase in the distance to financial institutions from one village in 
region reduces both knowledge and the likelihood of getting a loan. 
Poorer infrastructure in general also reduces the likelihood of credit 
market participation. On the other hand, previous government efforts 
appear to have a small positive effect on the likelihood of women 
borrowing.  
Finally, controlling for formal banks and local, informal 
networks, we find that rentenir (local money lender) has only a 
marginal effect on the borrowing activity of Indonesian women.  
The loan amount  
Turning to the loan amounts secured by successful borrowers, we 
find that membership in community activities and arisan are 
associated with smaller loans.  
Meanwhile, higher levels of education still have positive and 
large effects on the amount of credit received. Our further 
investigation shows that among those who borrowed from banks, 
only 6 percent have no formal education whereas 41 percent of them 
are higher-school graduates. However, the level of education among 
informal sector borrowers is much lower, with 14 percent not having 
any formal education, and only 13 percent being high-school 
graduates. This suggests that attaining higher education has two 
effects: on the one hand, it increases the likelihood of women 
borrowing from banks, while on the other hand, it also increases 
banks’ preference to lend to them. Loans from banks of course are 
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likely to be larger in size. The model estimates that loans to junior 
high is 60 percent higher, and to higher school more than double the 
amount respectively, relative to those with no formal education. 
These results clearly indicate that generally only better educated 
women are able to access larger loan amounts. 
Larger loans are also typically used for more ‘productive’ 
purposes, such as purchasing capital or for educational investments. 
Of all loans received, 45 percent were used productively with average 
of Rp.502,605, whilst the remaining were channelled to help 
household expenses or occasional uses and they are close to less than 
half of this value on average (Rp.256,000). As mentioned previously, 
the average cost of child schooling is higher than a loan received by a 
typical woman, and our model predicts that given knowledge, the 
probability of borrowing is not significantly higher for women with 
one more child currently attending school. Suppose that for this 
marginal child, the availability of resources increases the likelihood 
of school enrolment, then a failure to have access to credit may have 
an adverse effect on schooling.  
From a policy perspective therefore, improving both educational 
and social participation can increase the likelihood of achieving 
desirable outcomes. While building social networks is a crucial factor 
in increasing the likelihood of getting a loan, better educated women 
are more likely to get higher loan amounts.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The benefits of having microcredit programs targeted at women 
have been successfully demonstrated in the case of Bangladesh, India 
and Bolivia. This study examines whether or not Indonesian women 
have the same financial opportunities as women in these countries, in 
the absence of a targeted microcredit program in Indonesia. To this 
end, we use borrowing history to examine the demand for credit 
among ever-married Indonesian women, in the face of imperfect 
credit markets. Using a sequential bivariate probit model with sample 
selection, an approach that is novel in this literature, we highlight the 
significance of acknowledging ex ante double sample selection issues 
when using data from developing countries. Specifically we take into 
account whether or not women are aware of the existence of credit 
providers before they make their decision on whether to borrow or 
not. Then contingent on these selections and being successful in 
obtaining loan, we estimate the size of the loan demanded.  
 
Our hypothesis that we need to take into account a first layer of 
selection, namely whether or not women have knowledge of credit 
markets is supported in our results. Using the Indonesian Family Life 
Survey 2000 (IFLS3), we find that by not accounting for this layer of 
selection, the size of loan demanded may be underestimated by nearly 
one hundred percent, and that the traditional one-stage correction 
method that is commonly used in the literature still produces 
inconsistent estimates. In addition, we find a highly significant 
positive correlation between knowing the loan providers and having a 
successful borrowing outcome, which may suggest some benefits of 
having social networks.  
 
With regards to women borrowers’ characteristics, our results 
reveal that the propensity to borrow is higher for women from 
female-headed households and women with better social networks. 
Among women whose loans applications were successful, we find a 
strong positive correlation between education and the size of the loan 
received. Interestingly however, loan sizes are negatively correlated 
with our measures of social network. This implies that while having 
social networks can significantly increase the likelihood of a woman 
getting a loan, the size of the loan received can be small if she is 
poorly educated. Finally, we find that traditional money lenders 
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(rentenir) have little impact on Indonesian women’s borrowing 
activity.  
 
From a policy perspective, our study shows the demand for credit 
by women from female headed households, which are typically 
poorer. Further, our study highlights the important role of education 
and social networks in improving access to credit markets for women. 
 
 
i Although some studies (Goetz and Sengupta, 1994; Ackerly, 1995; 
Montgomery et al, 1996) question the empowerment value of 
microcredit loan, there is overwhelming support for the empowering 
effect on women of access to microcredit. See Kabeer (2001) for a 
review of the literature on whether or not microcredit ‘empowers’ 
women. 
ii This restriction is created by the manner in which the information 
about borrowing is collected in the survey (see below).  
iii It is a targeted credit-plus extension program of the Ministry of 
Agriculture with sponsors from Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).    
iv Also, the estimators of the coefficients and asymptotic covariance 
matrix should be amended to account for this. However, this is 
beyond the scope of this paper, and is therefore not done here. 
v The parameters are only estimable if there is at least one variable 
non-overlapping in x1 or x2.  
vi Morduch (1999) for instance argues that although the fixed-effects 
technique at the community level can capture unobserved village 
heterogeneity, it cannot capture the effect of peer network.   
vii Although there is a ‘mini’ community survey collected for some of 
the new communities that are near IFLS communities, it does not 
contain information on the main variables of interest such as financial 
institutions. There is also the problem of unpublished community 
code.    
viii We note that this variable depends on how the women respondents 
answer the survey question on whether or not they know of a place to 
borrow, or the manner in which the interviewers phrase the question 
(may be in tribe-specific language) to the respondents.  
ix It is a kind of group lottery where each member contributes a 
predetermined amount of money at periodic meetings. The member 
whose name comes out of a random drawing gets to keep the sum of 
all contributions in that meeting, and is to host the next meeting at her 
house where the next drawing takes place. The process continues 
until all members have had their names called out from the draw.  
x There is a type of rentenir who does not lend money but provides 
household goods on credit e.g., clothes or cookware. Unfortunately, 
there is no way of telling if the sampled women referred to them.  
xi We acknowledge that women who want to borrow may then look for 
information about credit facilities. However, we neglect this channel as 
the survey question we use initiates the sequential nature of the process 
and also note that our borrowing variable is actually successful 
borrowing outcome.   
xii Since there is no way of observing each woman’s motivation when 
they borrow, it is not possible to tell whether or not they deliberately 
asked for higher loans in anticipation of lower amounts.    
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Appendix 
Table 1: Loan Providers and Collateral Requirement 
 
  
No 
collateral Land Home Employment Other Total 
Private Banks 35 4   4 11 54 
Cooperative Banks 295 2 2 11 12 322 
Government Banks 64 49 19 48 45 225 
Employer 82       1 83 
Landlord 3         3 
Shopkeeper 11       2 13 
NGO 110     1 8 119 
Neighbourhood 116   2   1 119 
Arisan 156     1 2 159 
Farmer group 11         11 
Money lender 105 1     7 113 
Other 49 1     2 52 
TOTAL 1,037 57 23 65 91 1,273 
 Source: IFLS3 ; authors’ calculations
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2: Loan Providers and Purpose of loans 
 
  Occasional Daily  Education Capital Obligations Other Total 
Private Banks 3 7 7 36 0 1 54 
Cooperative Banks 37 72 57 131 4 20 321 
Government Banks 34 25 31 117 3 16 226 
Employer 18 34 13 9 5 3 82 
Landlord   3   0 1 0 4 
Shopkeeper 2 9   2 0 0 13 
NGO 15 48 16 28 7 5 119 
Neighbourhood 16 54 19 23 2 5 119 
Arisan 23 72 26 31 0 7 159 
Farmer group 2 1 2 5 1 0 11 
Money lender 14 48 5 42 3 1 113 
Other 9 8 8 21 3 3 52 
TOTAL 173 381 184 445 29 61 1,273 
Source: IFLS3 ; authors’  calculations  
 
Note: Occasional includes ceremonies, medical costs and purchases of household goods; 
Capital includes farm and non-farm expenses for business; Obligations include debt 
services, arisan payment and rents; and other includes vehicle expenses and transfers to 
relatives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics by headship status 
 
 Full sample Female-headed Male-headed 
 N=8,688 N=2,022 N=6, 666 
 Mean (Std. Dev.)* Mean (Std. Dev.)* Mean (Std. Dev.)* 
Dependent Variables    
Knowledgeable 0.634 0.585 0.649 
Borrow 0.101 0.099 0.102 
Log of loan 12.758 (1.677) 12.701 (1.603) 12.775 (1.699) 
Headship status    
Female-headed household 0.233   
Family networks    
Parents still alive 0.633 0.509 0.671 
Number of non-coresident sibling alive 3.294 (2.472) 2.753 (2.423) 3.458 (2.463) 
Social Networks    
Arisan membership 0.404 0.330 0.426 
Number of community activities participated 0.586 (0.905) 0.490 (0.846) 0.615 (0.920) 
Household is a member of cooperative 0.080 0.048 0.090 
Economic characteristics    
Log of assets 16.719 (1.563) 16.426 (1.688) 16.807 (1.512) 
Number of other household borrowers 0.117 (0.511) 0.096 (0.477) 0.124 (0.521) 
Whether household experienced economic failure in the 
last 5 years 0.047 0.053 0.045 
Whether Non labour income is available 0.716 0.621 0.744 
Individual and household characteristics    
Age 42.217 (15.694) 47.504 (17.751) 40.613 (14.644) 
  
Age squared 2028.533 (1487.020) 2571.610 (1768.414) 1863.802 (1348.025) 
Religion-non Muslim 0.185 0.173 0.189 
Educational attainment-Primary  0.479 0.438 0.491 
Educational attainment-Junior high school  0.129 0.103 0.138 
Educational attainment- Senior high 0.166 0.150 0.171 
Spouse’s education- primary  0.488 0.442 0.501 
Spouse’s education- junior high  0.139 0.133 0.141 
Spouse’s education- senior high 0.225 0.202 0.232 
Household size 6.085 (2.827) 5.937 (3.208) 6.129 (2.699) 
Number of children in school 0.820 (0.952) 0.651 (0.898) 0.871 (0.963) 
Know of potential informal lenders 0.017 0.021 0.015 
Community Variables    
Rural 0.554 0.524 0.562 
Distance to nearest FI 3.326 (7.028) 2.989 (6.249) 3.428 (7.245) 
Have been target of government program 0.635 0.609 0.643 
Region: Sumatra Island 0.193 0.202 0.190 
Region: Outer island 0.205 0.186 0.211 
Presence of local market  0.716 0.718 0.715 
Presence of public transport system in the village 0.238 0.237 0.239 
* continuous variable     
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics by Credit Market Activity 
 
 Full sample Knowledgeable Borrowers 
 N= 8,688 N= 5,508 N= 878 
 Mean (Std. Dev.)  Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.)* 
Dependent Variables    
Knowledgeable 0.634 1.000 1.000 
Borrow 0.101 0.160 1.000 
Headship status    
Female-headed household 0.233 0.215 0.227 
Family networks    
Parents still alive 0.633 0.706 0.680 
Number of non-coresident siblings alive 3.294 (2.472) 3.491 (2.526) 3.780 (2.554) 
Social Networks    
Arisan participants 0.404 0.510 0.742 
Number of community activities participated 0.586 (0.905) 0.711 (0.987) 1.166 (1.241) 
Household is a member of cooperative 0.080 0.102 0.218 
Economic characteristics    
Log of assets 16.719 (1.563) 16.935 (1.513) 17.020 (1.477) 
Number of other household borrowers 0.117 (0.511) 0.170 (0.609) 0.935 (1.168) 
Whether the hh experienced economic failure in the 
last 5 years 0.047 0.054 0.075 
Non labour income available  0.716 0.774 0.830 
Individual and household characteristics    
Age 42.217 (15.694) 39.313 (13.803) 41.363 (11.819) 
Age squared 2028.533 (1487.020) 1735.999 (1231.338) 1850.397 (1066.046) 
Religion- non Muslim 0.185 0.189 0.183 
  
Educational attainment-Primary school  0.479 0.478 0.482 
Educational attainment- Junior high  0.129 0.165 0.141 
Educational attainment- Senior High  0.166 0.235 0.288 
Spouse’s educational attainment- primary school  0.488 0.454 0.410 
    
    
Spouse’s educational attainment- junior high  0.139 0.163 0.166 
Spouse’s educational attainment- Senior high school  0.225 0.304 0.360 
Household size 6.085 (2.827) 6.116 (2.754) 6.035 (2.511) 
Number of children in school 0.820 (0.952) 0.849 (0.955) 0.918 (0.959) 
Know of  potential informal lender 0.010 0.017 0.035 
Community characteristics    
Rural 0.554 0.493 0.418 
Distance to nearest Financial Institution 3.326 (7.028) 2.940 (6.784) 1.665 (4.026) 
Community had government program 0.635 0.601 0.615 
Region: Sumatra Island 0.193 0.197 0.136 
Region: Outer island 0.205 0.208 0.143 
Presence of local market  0.716 0.762 0.791 
Presence of public transport system in the village 0.238 0.218 0.177 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 5: Marginal effects from bivariate probit estimations 
 
Know 
[1] 
Borrow 
[2] 
Marginal Effects 
[3] 
Headship status    
Female-headed household 0.077** 0.184*** 0.029*** 
 (0.037) (0.055) (0.010) 
Family Networks    
Parents still alive 0.060 -0.019 -0.006 
 (0.042) (0.061) (0.010) 
Number of non-coresident sibling alive 0.007 0.014 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.002) 
Social Networks    
Arisan participants 0.440*** 0.521*** 0.071*** 
 (0.034) (0.051) (0.010) 
Number of community activities participated 0.077*** 0.110*** 0.015*** 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.004) 
Household is a member of cooperative 0.101 0.336*** 0.061*** 
 (0.065) (0.067) (0.015) 
Economic characteristics    
Log of assets 0.084*** -0.017 -0.006** 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.003) 
Whether hh experienced economic failure in the last 5 years 0.015 0.075 0.012 
 (0.075) (0.091) (0.016) 
Whether non-labour income is available   0.098* 0.015* 
  (0.058) (0.009) 
Number of other household borrowers 0.553*** 1.174*** 0.167*** 
 (0.058) (0.024) (0.008) 
Individual and household characteristics    
Age 0.018*** 0.085*** 0.013*** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.002) 
Age squared -0.0003*** -0.0009*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Non Muslim -0.144 0.035 0.013 
 (0.042) (0.059) (0.010) 
Education-Primary school  0.411*** 0.357*** 0.041*** 
 (0.044) (0.080) (0.013) 
Education- Junior high school  0.733*** 0.302*** 0.026 
 (0.066) (0.102) (0.019) 
Contd. on the next page
  
 
Education- Higher school  0.951*** 0.506*** 0.058*** 
 (0.075) (0.106) (0.022) 
Spouse’s education- primary school  0.215*** -0.043 -0.016 
 (0.058) (0.096) (0.015) 
Spouse’s education- junior high school  0.334*** 0.131 0.008 
 (0.064) (0.105) (0.017) 
Spouse’s education- higher school  0.404*** 0.126 0.005 
 (0.069) (0.104) (0.017) 
Household size -0.021*** -0.031*** -0.004*** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.002) 
Number of children in school  0.021 0.003 
  (0.025) (0.004) 
Know of potential informal money-lender  0.300** 0.061* 
  (0.149) (0.037) 
Community characteristics    
Rural -0.061* 0.006 0.004 
 (0.036) (0.051) (0.008) 
Distance to nearest Financial Institution -0.005** -0.014*** -0.002*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) 
Target of government program 0.013 0.155** 0.024** 
 (0.049) (0.067) (0.010) 
Region: Sumatra Island 0.166***  -0.007*** 
 (0.043)  (0.002) 
Region: Outer island 0.267***  -0.010*** 
. (0.041)  (0.002) 
Presence of local market  0.302***  -0.014*** 
 (0.035)  (0.002) 
Presence of public transport system in the village 0.096***  -0.004*** 
 (0.037)  (0.001) 
Rho   0.913*** 
   (0.082) 
Log L   -6,222.481 
N   8,688 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses and ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively. For dichotomous variables, the marginal effect reflects the change when the 
variable changes from 0 to 1. For the Bivariate probit model, the marginal effects reflect the expected 
borrowing given women borrowers have the knowledge of credit providers. 
  
Table 6: Loan demand estimations 
 
Double selection 
[1] 
One selection 
[2] 
No selection 
[3] 
Observed by lenders    
Age 0.097*** 0.104*** 0.128*** 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) 
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education- Primary school  0.128 0.259 0.333* 
 (0.212) (0.199) (0.198) 
Education- Junior high school  0.595** 0.745*** 0.820*** 
 (0.250) (0.236) (0.236) 
Education- Higher school  1.574*** 1.737*** 1.854*** 
 (0.239) (0.223) (0.220) 
Female-headed household -0.147 -0.143 -0.107 
 (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) 
Arisan membership -0.329** -0.239* -0.091 
 (0.144) (0.138) (0.126) 
Number of community activities participated  -0.143*** -0.131*** -0.105* 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) 
Household is a member of cooperative -0.016 0.017 0.081 
 (0.136) (0.136) (0.134) 
Rural 0.081 0.065 0.068 
 (0.110) (0.109) (0.110) 
Region: Sumatra Island 0.069 0.083 0.045 
 (0.158) (0.157) (0.158) 
Region: Outer island 0.721*** 0.754*** 0.735*** 
 (0.155) (0.153) (0.155) 
Lambda- Know -3.384*   
 (1.893)   
Lambda- borrow -0.583*** -0.418***  
 (0.173) (0.161)  
Constant 11.022*** 10.395*** 8.976*** 
 (0.833) (0.794) (0.579) 
Expected size of Loans received by a typical woman (RP.) 682,573 551,989 347,322 
N 878 878 878 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
